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LEGAL SHORTS

SIGNIFICANT MONTANA CASES
Hannah Higgins & Katy Lindberg*

I. IN

RE

MARRIAGE

OF

ELDER & MAHLUM1

In In re Marriage of Elder & Mahlum, the Montana Supreme Court
held that Montana statute does not consider post-dissolution Sheriffs’ Retirement System disability retirement benefits to be a marital estate asset.2
The Court reversed and remanded the case for the equitable division of the
marriage’s assets after determining that the district court erred in finding a
husband’s post-dissolution SRS disability retirement benefits to be a marital
asset.3
In 2002, Sam Mahlum and Terri Elder got married.4 During their marriage they had two children and lived in Augusta, Montana.5 While Terri
worked as a substitute teacher and stayed home to care for their children,
Sam worked as a deputy sheriff for the Lewis and Clark County Sheriff’s
Office.6 Sam sustained a permanently disabling injury in 2006 in a workrelated motor vehicle accident, which forced him to leave the job six years
later in 2012 and work at the Montana Human Rights Bureau.7 Similarly
though, his injuries caused him to leave that job in 2015.8 Thereafter, he
* Candidates for J.D. 2021 at the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of
Montana.
1. 462 P.3d 209 (Mont. 2020).
2. Id. at 214, 218.
3. Id. at 218.
4. Id. at 210.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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obtained a disability determination from the Montana Public Employee Retirement Board and began receiving monthly, non-taxable disability retirement benefits from the Montana Sheriff’s Retirement System (“SRS”).9
Sam is eligible to continue receiving these disability benefits until 2025,
when he becomes eligible for normal, taxable SRS retirement benefits at
age 50.10
In 2017, Terri filed for dissolution. The final decree of dissolution of
marriage, which divided the marital estate and provided for a child custody
arrangement, was ordered a year later.11 At the time of the dissolution, Sam
was receiving $3,397.73 in monthly disability benefits with a 3% guaranteed annual increase.12 Terri’s adjusted gross income in 2017 was
$17,054.13
In the dissolution, the parties agreed that Terri would keep the home
(which had a $140,000 outstanding mortgage balance); that each party
would assume their own student loan and debts; that Sam would take all the
couple’s outstanding credit card and federal tax debt along with his own
medical debts; and that Terri would keep both vehicles, while Sam would
keep the Harley Davidson motorcycle.14 Child support was not addressed,
and spousal maintenance was not requested.15 However, the divisibility of
Sam’s SRS disability retirement benefits was disputed until the district
court found the benefits should be equitably divided because they were no
different than Sam’s normal SRS retirement benefits.16 Based on this finding, the district court apportioned Sam’s SRS benefits—including those he
received prior to the switch to regular SRS service retirement benefits—
between Terri and Sam on a 50/50 basis.17 Sam appealed the finding.18
Under Montana law, district courts are given broad discretion when
dealing with an equitable division of marital assets.19 A district court’s findings of fact must show that the division of assets is equitable20 and that the
apportionment is fair and reasonable under the totality of circumstances.21
Abuse of discretion may occur when the court relies on a clearly erroneous
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.; MONT. CODE ANN. § 19-7-102 (2019).
Elder and Mahlum, 462 P.3d at 210.
Id.
Id. at 210–11 (amounting to roughly $40,772.76 per year).
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-202(1).
Elder and Mahlum, 462 P.3d at 211–12 (notably, a true 50/50 split is not required).
Id.
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finding of fact or conclusion of law.22 Findings of fact accounting for and
valuing marital estate assets and liabilities are reviewed for clear error—
meaning it is not supported by substantial evidence, the lower court made a
misapprehension, or the Court has a firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made—and the ultimate apportionment of marital assets is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.23
To support its finding that Sam’s early SRS disability retirement benefits were post-dissolution employment income (rather than a divisible marital asset) the Court analyzed various statutory defined benefit retirement
plans for state and local government employees.24 This was the first time
the Court ever considered whether defined benefit plan disability benefits,
administered under Title 19, Chapter 2 of the Montana Code Annotated,
should be treated the same way as regular SRS retirement benefits.25
Under statutory SRS defined benefit retirement plans,26 normal service
retirement benefits are based on length of service (a group-particular percentage of the highest average compensation over those years) and are paid
from group-specific retirement finds funded by payroll withholdings and
employer contributions.27 Ordinary retirement benefits are generally considered to be marital estate assets and are subject to equitable division under
§ 40-4-202(1) because they are considered to be deferred compensation.28
However, SRS service-related disability retirement benefits are a different
type of benefit that cannot be treated as a divisible marital asset, according
to the Court.29
In examining the different types of SRS normal service, early service,
and non-service related disability retirement benefits, the Court concluded
that all the plans not only have similar eligibility requirements, but they also
have similar calculation methods.30 Put simply, the plans were “essentially
a form or derivative of previously earned but deferred compensation, later
payable upon particular retirement eligibility.”31 The important notable factor for SRS retirement benefits in a marriage dissolution is that the benefits
are considered to be deferred compensation that has been earned during the
22. Id. at 212 (citing In re Marriage of Bessette, 434 P.3d 894, 898–99 (Mont. 2019)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 212–15 (including normal service retirement, early service retirement, and disability retirement benefits).
25. Id. at 213–14.
26. See generally, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 19-2-101 through § 19-3-2143, § 19-5-101 through
§ 19-9-1303.
27. Elder and Mahlum, 462 P.3d at 212.
28. Id. at 213.
29. Id. at 214, 217–18.
30. Id. at 214.
31. Id.
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marriage.32 However, the treatment and calculation for SRS service-related
disability benefits differs because, unlike the previous types, these benefits
do not depend on reaching a certain age or being vested—they only depend
on whether the person was injured in the line of duty and can no longer
perform job duties because of their disability.33
In considering this difference, the Court explained that post-dissolution
employment income does not count as a marital estate asset because it has
not yet accrued and thus does not yet belong to either party.34 SRS disability retirement benefits that are based upon an injury that rendered an SRS
member unable to work before completing 20 years of service act as compensation for the lost income that the member would have been able to earn
but for the disability.35 Accordingly, future post-dissolution income that is
replaced by post-dissolution SRS disability retirement benefits cannot be
considered marital assets under § 40-4-202(1).36
Following this analysis, the Court held that Sam’s service-related disability retirement benefits are more similar to a replacement of future employment income rather than deferred income for work previously completed.37 The error of the district court, then, was not that the court considered Sam’s disability income to be a replacement of future income, but that
it erroneously considered that income to be divisible as a marital estate
asset under § 40-4-202(1).38
Nevertheless, although the benefits are not divisible as a marital asset
in the dissolution, they should still be considered when determining how to
equitably divide the marital estate.39 Thus, in the present case, Terri’s and
Sam’s marital estate was not equitably divided since the disability retirement benefits were erroneously included as a marital asset.40 Instead, the
disability retirement benefits only should have been considered in whether
any spousal maintenance should be granted to Terri.41
Going forward, the Montana practitioner should take heed of which
statutes are relevant in determining retirement benefits. The analysis largely
comes down to when and how the benefit will be received by the working
or disabled recipient. Notably, the treatment of SRS early disability retirement benefits is unique compared to other SRS retirement benefits. This
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 214–15.
at
at
at
at

214.
215.
217–18.
217.

at 217–18.
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could foreshadow a changing front in the way the Montana Supreme Court
treats not only retirement benefits (particularly disability retirement benefits), but how marital estates are equitably divided. For now, though, it is
important for the Montana practitioner to know that SRS early disability
retirement benefits receive different treatment under Montana statute.
—Hannah Higgins
II. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY V. THE ASBESTOS
CLAIMS COURT 42
In Maryland Casualty Company v. The Asbestos Claims Court, the
Montana Supreme Court held that the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 324(A) is an additional prerequisite for determining whether an individual
that affirmatively undertakes to provide aid or services to a third party owes
a duty of reasonable care to others based on the foreseeable harm or risks
arising from the third party’s conduct.43 Now, Montana practitioners must
consider an elemental formulation of § 324(A)44 in conjunction with the
analysis of the foreseeability of harm and public policy considerations, in
order to determine whether an alleged tortfeasor owes a common law duty
of reasonable care to others based on the actions of a third party.45
In the early 1920s, Edward Alley formed the Zonolite Company,
which mined and processed vermiculite in the Libby, Montana area using
open-pit mining techniques, mill facilities, and screening/loading facilities.46 It was acquired by W.R. Grace and Company (“Grace”) in 1963.47
Grace continued to mine and process vermiculite ore from the Libby area
until 1990.48 The raw vermiculite ore was processed at a mountainside mill
using both dry-mill and open wet-mill processes until 1974 when all
processes were switched to closed wet-milling.49 The open wet-mill and
42. 460 P.3d 882 (Mont. 2020) (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 907.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324(A) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (the elemental formulation being: (1) whether
the tortfeasor affirmatively undertook to render aid or services to a third party; (2) whether the tortfeasor
should recognize that aid or those services to be necessary for the protection of other person or property
under the circumstances; and (3) one or more of the following special circumstances exist: (a) tortfeasor
fails to use reasonable care and the preexisting risk of harm to others—which is at issue—increases; (b)
the tortfeasor assumes some responsibility of the third party to perform a preexisting legal duty of care
owed by the third party to the others at issue; or (c) the harm occurs because the others or the third party
relied on the tortfeasor to competently perform the undertaking).
45. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 901.
46. Id. at 887.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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dry-mill processes caused a huge amount of asbestos-laden airborne dust.50
After being processed, the product would move to the screening/loading
facility where it was screened, sorted, and then stored or shipped to various
areas around the country.51
Although not all vermiculite naturally occurs with asbestos, the vermiculite mining site in Libby was mixed with hazardous amphibole asbestos.52 Due to the hazardous nature of the vermiculite being mined at Libby,
the Industrial Hygiene Division of the Montana Board of Health inspected
and studied Grace’s facilities, often reporting extreme levels of airborne
dust—especially in the mill facility—which increased employee risk of silicosis and asbestos-related disease.53 The asbestos dust hazard was a constant concern to Grace, who received repeated notices, warnings, and recommendations from the Montana Board of Health and other entities, including its workers’ compensation insurer.54
Maryland Casualty Company (“MCC”) undertook to provide Grace
with workers’ compensation insurance from 1963 through 1973 under a
policy that included limiting language reserving MCC’s right to inspect, or
not inspect, Grace’s workplace.55 MCC actively inspected, monitored, and
conferred with Grace regarding the asbestos dust hazard.56
Grace employees were required to undergo a pre-employment physical
examination and chest x-ray.57 After receiving a report from a Libby doctor
who was growing concerned of developing asbestos-related lung conditions
within Grace’s employees, MCC began formulating a program to control
and prevent asbestos dust related problems.58 The program aimed to control
the asbestos dust, implement safety protocols, streamline workers’ compensation claims, protect Grace’s employees from dust that could not be controlled, and provide regular medical attention (including x-rays) to monitor
employee lung conditions.59 It is unclear to what extent Grace implemented
this program, but it is clear that Grace did expand its health screening pro50. Id.
51. Id. at 887–88.
52. Id. at 888.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 889.
55. Id. at 888–89 (The language further qualified any MCC inspection as an inspection relating to
the insurability of Grace’s workplace rather than a safety inspection. It also explained that MCC did not
warrant a safe or healthful workplace or warrant that the workplace complied with laws and regulations.).
56. See generally id. at 888–91.
57. Id. at 889.
58. Id. (MCC used their Engineering Division and their Medical Division in developing the program).
59. Id. at 890.
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gram.60 Although MCC recommended lowering and maintaining the dust
levels at 5 million particles per cubic foot or less, Grace voluntarily set its
levels at 10 million particles per cubic foot and considered MCC’s recommendations to be “unreasonable[,] impossible[,] and unnecessary.”61 MCC
continued to provide substantial risk management and support through
1974.62
One particular employee, Ralph Hutt, worked for Grace for approximately 18 months between 1968 and 1969 at the mountainside mill and the
mining site.63 He was provided with a paper respirator, which he was not
required to wear, and was denied a safer respirator.64 Although Hutt was in
a group of sixty workers that MCC recommended be more regularly tested,
Grace rejected the recommendation and only tested Hutt prior to his hiring
and prior to his leaving employment.65
MCC’s involvement in the mitigation of the asbestos dust hazard was
apparent.66 In fact, certain internal MCC communications reflect an awareness and growing concerns relating to the medical results from Grace’s employees.67 Other documents reflect MCC’s awareness that the asbestos-dust
levels at the Grace mill continuously exceeded industry standards from
1967 through1969.68
Hutt brought negligence and bad faith claims against MCC after developing respiratory problems in 1990.69 After the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment on Hutt’s negligence and bad faith claims, the Asbestos Court (1) granted MCC summary judgment on Hutt’s bad faith claim
due to the fact that he had never brought a predicate workers’ compensation
claim, (2) granted Hutt summary judgment on the grounds that MCC owed
Grace’s employees a legal duty of care based on the foreseeability of the
risk of harm, and (3) denied summary judgment to both parties on whether
the negligence claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations.70
The Montana Supreme Court considered on de novo review whether
the Asbestos Court erred in finding that MCC did owe Grace’s employees a
common law duty to warn them of a known risk of harm caused by Grace’s
actions.71 It found that the Asbestos Court reached the right decision but on
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 891–92.
Id. at 892.
Id.
See generally id. at 888–91.
Id. at 908–12 (Gustafson, J., with Shea, McKinnon, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 891.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id. at 892–93.
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incorrect grounds.72 According to the Court, the correct grounds are based
on an application of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324(A), which the
Asbestos Court failed to apply.73
The essential elements of a negligence claim are (1) a legal duty owed
to the claimant; (2) breach of the legal duty; (3) harm caused by the breach;
and (4) damages.74 A legal duty may arise from common law or from statute.75 It is widely established in Montana law that whether a tortfeasor
owed a claimant a legal duty of care is a matter of law.76 Generally, an
individual owes a common law duty of care to another when the harm is
reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances and the imposition of such
duty comports with public policy.77 Under that analysis, there is no common law duty to protect others from acts of a third party except where a
special relationship—of which there are varying types—or an affirmative
undertaking exists.78 Under the common law, two types of affirmative undertakings give rise to a special duty: first, a duty to another based on an
affirmative undertaking,79 and second, a duty to a third party based on an
affirmative undertaking.80
Prior to this case Montana had not yet adopted § 324(A).81 But, in
deciding that MCC did owe a duty to Grace’s employees, the Court discussed the application of both § 323 and § 324(A).82 The Court found that
§ 323 was not applicable to this case because MCC did not affirmatively
undertake any action—like providing aid or services—that directly affected
Hutt or Grace’s other employees, aside from the risk manage program provided to Grace.83 Thus, the Court found that MCC owed no special duty to
Grace’s employees under § 323.84
72. Id. at 892–93, 907.
73. Id. at 907.
74. Id. at 893 (citing Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d 277, 278–79 (Mont. 1989)).
75. Id. (citing Fisher v. Swift Transp. Co., 181 P.3d 601, 606 (Mont. 2008)); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 1-1-105, -107, -108, -109.
76. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 894 (citing Bassett v. Lamantia, 417 P.3d 299 (Mont. 2018)).
77. Id. (citing Prindel v. Ravalli County, 133 P.3d 165, 178–80 (Mont. 2006); Busta v. Columbus
Hosp. Corp., 916 P.2d 122, 133–40 (Mont. 1996)).
78. Id. at 895.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING TO RENDER
SERVICES § 323 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324(A) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
81. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 901.
82. Id. at 896–904.
83. Id. at 896–97 (discussing Nelson v. Driscoll, 983 P.2d 972 (Mont. 1999) (where a police officer
was held liable for the wrongful death of an impaired pedestrian after releasing the pedestrian from a
traffic stop and directing her to leave her vehicle)).
84. Id. at 897.
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Conversely, though, the Court—in adopting § 324(A)—found that
MCC owed a special duty of care to protect Grace’s employees from foreseeable risks of harm caused by Grace’s conduct because of MCC’s affirmative undertakings or services that it provided to Grace.85 The Court, contrary to Hutt’s arguments, found § 324(A) to be a “consistent extension” of
Montana common law tort principles.86 It based its decision on the fact that
§ 324(A) is widely applied in other state and federal jurisdictions and (although there aren’t many cases with similar circumstances applying
§ 324(A)) those cases that mirrored the facts of the present case demonstrated the section’s utility in determining whether a common law duty existed.87 Particularly, the Court analyzed Fackelman v. Lac d’Amiante du
Quebec,88 which held that § 324(A) provides a useful “elemental formation” in determining whether an insurer owes a common law duty of reasonable care based on third-party actions.89
Following its formal adoption of § 324(A), the Court walked through
the section’s factual predicates that give rise to a special duty: (1) increased
risk, (2) assumption of another’s legal duty, or (3) reliance on an undertaking.90 These factual predicates arise in a situation where the alleged
tortfeasor provided services to a third party that were necessary, under the
circumstances, to protect others and the harm arose from the independent
actions of the third party.91 The first predicate—increased risk—is established where a claimant states92 or shows93 sufficient facts to conclude that
an affirmative action by the alleged tortfeasor caused such a change in preexisting conditions that it increased the risk of harm to others beyond
whatever risk was initially created by the third-party conduct.94 The second
predicate—assumption of another’s legal duty—is established where a
claimant states or shows sufficient facts to conclude that the tortfeasor
knowingly assumed (via performance or otherwise) a part of the third
85. Id. at 907.
86. Id. at 901.
87. Id. at 899.
88. 942 A.2d 127 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (a case with facts strikingly similar to the
present case: a 19 year-old man worked in an asbestos mine for a ten-month period, his health was
monitored, he never received the result of the monitoring, was never required to wear a mask, and was
diagnosed with asbestosis in 2002. The workers’ compensation employer conducted air surveys, provided a safety program, and was aware of the hazardous air quality levels).
89. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 900–01.
90. See generally id. at 901–07; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON
FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324(A) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
91. Maryland Cas. Co. 460 P.3d at 897; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD
PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324(A).
92. Pursuant to MONT. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (2019).
93. Pursuant to MONT. R. CIV. P. 56.
94. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 901–02; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO
THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324(A)(a).
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party’s duty to others that is related to the harm at issue.95 The final predicate—reliance on the undertaking—is established where a claimant states
or shows sufficient facts to conclude that the claimant or the third party
relied on the alleged tortfeasor’s undertaking (or an aspect thereof) and such
reliance caused the claimant or third party to forego taking precautions or
otherwise remediating the risk at issue.96 In order to establish a showing of
reliance under §324(A)(c) the claimant must demonstrate (1) the claimant’s
awareness of the alleged tortfeasor’s undertaking or awareness of an aspect
thereof; (2) reasonable belief by the claimant that the alleged tortfeasor
would competently provide aid or services, in full or in part, at issue; and,
(3) that the claimant did not take precautionary or remedial measures due to
relying on the alleged tortfeasor’s undertaking.97
Applying all of this to the case at hand, the Court considered the parties’ summary judgment motions.98 It found that Grace, as an employer,
owed its employees a general common law duty to provide both a reasonably safe workplace and tools against workplace risks that were reasonably
foreseeable, including warning of those invisible dangers.99 Further, just
providing risk management programs incident to workers’ compensation insurance was insufficient to establish that MCC assumed, in any capacity,
Grace’s independent duty to provide a safe workplace.100
Ultimately, based upon the available Rule 56 record, the Court held
that MCC owed a common law duty of care to Grace’s employees, including Hutt, under § 324(A)(b) and § 324(A)(c).101 The Court explained that
many of the issues relating to how Grace took MCC’s advice and how
MCC exclusively provided medical evaluations and monitoring were beyond genuine dispute for the Rule 56 record.102 MCC’s assumption of the
employee-specific medical monitoring created a duty for MCC to act with
reasonable care to protect Grace’s employees from the known risk of asbestos exposure because, under § 324(A)(b), it constituted an assumption of a
95. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 902–03 (whether the duty was nondelegable does not preclude
a finding of assumption of the duty and proof that the alleged tortfeasor was going to completely assume
the duty is not necessarily required); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON
FOR NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324(A)(b).
96. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 903–04 (proof that the claimant or third party tried to cease or
forego taking precautionary or remedial measures is not necessarily required in the statement of showing
of sufficient facts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSON FOR NEGLIGENT
PERFORMANCE OF UNDERTAKING § 324(A)(c).
97. Maryland Cas. Co., 460 P.3d at 903–04.
98. Id. at 904–06.
99. Id. at 904.
100. Id. at 905.
101. Id. at 906–07.
102. Id. at 905–06.
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duty owed by Grace to its employees.103 MCC owed a duty under
§ 324(A)(c) because Grace relied on MCC to perform a specific aspect
(medical evaluations and recommendations) of the workplace safety and
risk management.104
Thus, although the Abestos Court reached its conclusion on incorrect
grounds, the holding was ultimately correct.105 Accordingly, the Court affirmed that, under the circumstances, MCC owed a common law duty to
Grace’s employees to use reasonable care to warn them of the known risk
of asbestos exposure and its dangers.106
The case is laden with concurrences, beginning with Justice Gustafson’s concurrence, which Justices Shea and McKinnon joined.107 Justice
Gustafson agreed with the Court’s holding, but expressed that MCC should
have owed a duty to Grace’s employees under all three § 324(A) predicates.108 She argued that sufficient facts existed to show that, under
§ 324(A)(a), MCC increased the preexisting risk by concealing the asbestos
harm from Grace’s employees.109 Justice Gustafson detailed the extensive
correspondence that showed an understanding by MCC that the dust problem existed and that a safety plan—including medical involvement—would
be required to deal with the issue.110 The correspondence also showed that
MCC intended to conceal information about the asbestos issue regardless of
the fact that a local Libby doctor had noticed lung abnormalities in many of
Grace’s employees.111 Justice Gustafson concluded that the record showed
clear evidence of MCC increasing the risk to Grace’s employees with its
actions that concealed the true harm of the asbestos.112 Thus, MCC owed a
duty of care to Grace’s employees, including Hutt, under § 324(A)(a).113
Regarding § 324(A)(b) and (c), Justice Gustafson agreed that MCC
owed Grace’s employees a duty because of the assumption of a duty and the
reliance by Grace on that assumption.114 She believed that MCC, in its actions to provide risk management, went way beyond that of merely providing workers’ compensation insurance.115 According to Justice Gustafson,
MCC’s actions indicate that it assumed a large portion of Grace’s duty to
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 906.
at 906–07.
at 907.
at 908–14 (Gustafson, J., with Shea, McKinnon, JJ., concurring).

at
at
at
at

908–12.
911.
912–13.
913.
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provide a safe workplace to Grace’s employees, and thus MCC owed a duty
to Grace’s employees under § 324(A)(b).116 Further, she argued that the
Court applied § 324(A)(c) too narrowly under the facts of this case because,
contrary to the Court’s holding, Hutt was able to show that he relied on
MCC’s lack of communication of the x-ray results as meaning that there
was no existing harm.117 Consequently, MCC also owed a duty under
§ 324(A)(c).118
Next, Chief Justice McGrath wrote to concur with both the Court’s
opinion and Justice Gustafson’s concurrence.119 In his concurrence he addressed another issue: Grace’s bankruptcy potentially precluding workers’
claims against MCC.120 The Chief Justice elucidated that Hutt and other
potential employee plaintiffs will not be precluded from recovering from
MCC where the plaintiff can show that MCC breached its duty and the
breach caused the plaintiff’s injuries.121 Because Hutt’s claims122 do not
satisfy the “derivative liability” requirement under § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code,123 the harm suffered is predicated on MCC’s individual conduct.124 Consequently, any recovery must come from MCC’s assets.125 The
final concurrence, provided by Justice Shea, explained that he declined to
join Chief Justice McGrath’s concurrence because the issue of bankruptcy
had not been briefed in this case.126
Following, Justice McKinnon provided her own concurrence that
agrees with the Court’s Opinion and with the Chief Justice’s and Justice
Gustafson’s concurrences.127 However, Justice McKinnon believed that the
use of § 324(A) is an unnecessary route to identify if a duty exists because
Montana precedent had already provided an adequate framework.128 She
elaborated that, while § 324(A) does not produce an inconsistent result,
Montana’s precedent already supports a finding that a duty exists where the
duty comports with public policy and the defendant could have foreseen
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 914 (McGrath, J., with Gustafson, McKinnon, JJ., concurring).
120. Id. (MCC briefed extensively regarding why § 324(A) should be adopted, presumably with the
intent to shield itself from potential liability using Grace’s bankruptcy).
121. Id.
122. Under the Court’s § 324(A) analysis and holding.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2020) (creating a channeling injunction in asbestos bankruptcies that stops
certain third-party claims against the debtor’s insurer (Grace being the debtor, MCC being the debtor’s
insurer) from proceeding in state court).
124. Maryland Cas. Co., at 914–15.
125. Id. at 915.
126. Id. at 917 (Shea, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 916–17 (McKinnon, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 916.
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their conduct would cause harm to the claimant.129 Applying Montana precedent to the present case, Justice McKinnon found that MCC’s affirmative
actions created a duty of care because MCC could obviously foresee that
Grace’s employees were being harmed without MCC’s action and public
policy encourages adequate worker safety plans.130 She ultimately reached
the same conclusion as the Court, but found the application of § 324(A) to
be overly complicated.131
In light of Maryland Casualty Company, Montana practitioners should
be aware that § 324(A) has been adopted and should be used when establishing whether a tortfeasor owed a special duty to a third party. This new
adoption could entirely change the frontier of workers’ compensation
claims—including how employers and worker’s compensation insurers format their relationships. Particularly, this case changes the outlook of the
Asbestos Court, providing many potential plaintiffs with a huge step forward in recovering from their work-related asbestos injuries. Depending on
a workers’ compensation insurer’s past actions, Plaintiffs may find an easier
path to recover using this newly adopted section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
—Hannah Higgins
III. GREENWOOD V. MONTANA DEPARTMENT

OF

REVENUE 132

In Greenwood v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Montana Supreme Court held Greenwood did not sever his Montana Residency when
he moved to Texas because he continued to represent himself as a Montana
resident and continued to utilize the benefits of Montana residency.133
Clayton Greenwood (“Greenwood”) and his family relocated from
Texas to Montana in 1999. While living in Montana, Greenwood’s children
attended school, he registered to vote, obtained a Montana Driver’s License
and fishing licenses, opened a bank account, and registered vehicles in the
state.134 Greenwood continued to manage multiple businesses located in
Texas during his time in Montana. Greenwood and his family returned to
Texas in 2004.135
In 2013, the Montana Department of Revenue (“DOR”) began an audit
on Greenwood’s non-resident individual income tax returns for 2008
129. Id. (citing Fisher v. Swift Transp. Co., 181 P.3d 601, 607 (Mont. 2008); Bassett v. Lamantia,
417 P.3d 299, 309 (Mont. 2018)).
130. Id. at 916–17.
131. Id. at 917.
132. 2020 MT 149; __ P.3d __ (Mont. 2020).
133. Id. ¶ 19.
134. Id. ¶ 2.
135. Id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2020

13

Montana Law Review, Vol. 81 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 6
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\81-2\MON206.txt

336

unknown

Seq: 14

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

17-AUG-20

12:49

Vol. 81

through 2012.136 The DOR requested Greenwood provide additional information to help determine his residency status. Greenwood provided information showing he had worked in Texas since 1977, owned real property
and purchased vehicles in Texas, had healthcare and insurance in Texas,
and employed an accountant in Texas from 2008 to 2012.137 However,
Greenwood had retained his Montana driver’s license, voted in Montana in
2008, and continued to own property and receive mail in Kalispell.138 Most
importantly, Greenwood registered vehicles in Montana and claimed Montana residency for car insurance and hunting and fishing licenses.139
The DOR, after reviewing Greenwood’s responses, found Greenwood
was a Montana resident for tax purposes from 2008 to 2012. The DOR
assessed $515,321.02 in Montana resident income tax, interest, and penalties against Greenwood, who appealed the decision to the DOR’s Office of
Dispute Resolution (“ODR”).140 The ODR held a hearing on the appeal,
where Greenwood testified he had received over twenty-one Montana resident hunting, fishing, and trapping licenses from 2008 to 2012.141 Further,
Greenwood testified he registered vehicles in Montana to avoid paying
sales tax in Texas.142 Following the hearing, ODR affirmed the DOR’s decision.
Greenwood then appealed the ODR decision to the Montana Tax Appeal Board (“MTAB”), who affirmed the ODR.143 In MTAB’s decision, the
Board was critical of Greenwood’s credibility and his willingness “to misrepresent himself to save money on hunting licenses.”144 Following the
MTAB decision, Greenwood petitioned the district court for an appeal,
which the court denied.145 He then appealed to the Montana Supreme
Court.146
On appeal, Greenwood argued he abandoned his Montana residency
when he returned to Texas in 2004.147 He argues that during the 2008 to
2012 audit period, he was a Texas resident improperly claiming Montana
136. Id. ¶ 3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. ¶ 5.
141. Id.
142. Id. ¶ 6.
143. Id. ¶ 7.
144. Id. (quoting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and Opportunity for Judicial Review
at p. 26, ¶ 31 (Montana Tax Appeal Board 2015)). The MTAB found Greenwood “saved over $900 each
year” by obtaining a Montana resident hunting and fishing license.
145. Id. ¶ 8.
146. Id.
147. Id. ¶ 16.
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resident benefits.148 Further, Greenwood argued the MTAB decision was
not based on objective factors, but, rather, on his “improper and self-serving
declarations of Montana residency.”149 The DOR disagreed, arguing the
MTAB’s findings of fact were founded on substantial evidence and showed
that Greenwood was a Montana resident during the audit period, not simply
improperly claiming Montana resident benefits.150
The Court began its analysis discussing the circumstances under which
a person obtains Montana residency for state income tax purposes. Under
Mont. Code Ann. § 15-30-2101(28), a person becomes a Montana resident
if he or she (1) has a residence in Montana, or (2) “maintains a permanent
place of abode in [Montana] and [ ] has not established a residence elsewhere.”151 Further, the Court examined Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-215, which
provides that “a person may only have one residence,” and that a person
cannot change their residence without “the union of act and intent.”152
In examining whether Greenwood was a resident, the Court found no
facts supporting that Greenwood had a union of act and intent to end his
Montana residency and become a resident of Texas.153 The Court pointed to
Greenwood’s “repeated[ ] . . . actions to maintain the benefits and privileges
of Montana residency,” including obtaining resident hunting, fishing, and
trapping licenses for each of the four years of the audit period.154 Further,
the Court highlighted that Greenwood represented himself as a Montana
resident when he renewed his Montana driver’s license, when he obtained
various recreation licenses and a Montana concealed carry permit, and
when he voted in Montana.155
Greenwood benefitted greatly from holding himself out as a Montana
resident, and, through his legal challenges, sought “to bear none of the
cost.”156 The Court upheld the district court’s affirmation of the MTAB’s
administrative decision and deferred to the MTAB’s findings regarding the
credibility of the evidence.157
The facts of this case and the Court’s decision highlight issues Montana practitioners should be cognizant of when working with clients relocating from Montana to another state, or who live in Montana for part of the
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Brief of Appellee at 6–9, Greenwood v. Montana Dept. of Rev. (Mont. March 11, 2020) (No.
DA 19-0615).
151. Greenwood ¶ 12 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-2101(28) (2019)).
152. Id. ¶ 13 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-215).
153. Id. ¶ 17.
154. Id. ¶ 17–18.
155. Id. ¶ 18.
156. Id. ¶ 19.
157. Id.
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year. The Court’s decision here makes it clear that a person must show a
union of act and intent when ending his or her Montana residency. Individuals who seek to benefit, in any way, from Montana residency do not satisfy
this requirement. While Greenwood benefitted from his Montana residency
in multiple ways, practitioners should advise their clients that any action,
including maintaining a Montana driver’s license, or voting in the state,
could subject them to state income taxes.
—Katy Lindberg
III. RAMON V. SHORT 158
In Ramon v. Short, the Montana Supreme Court held, as a preliminary
issue, that the Court’s review of the district court’s refusal to enjoin the
Lincoln County Sheriff’s hold of an inmate pursuant to a federal immigration detainer request was not moot because the constitutional issues involved in the case met the requirements of the public interest exception.159
Further, the Court held a new arrest occurred when a Montana law enforcement officer carried out a federal immigration detainer,160 and that Montana
law enforcement officers do not have authority under Montana law to conduct a civil immigration arrest at the request of federal officials.161
Agustin Ramon (“Ramon”) was arrested on August 3, 2018, for burglary and was held at the Lincoln County Detention Center on a $25,000
bond.162 The same day, the Border Patrol issued a Form I-247A detainer
request to the Detention Center, requesting that the Detention Center not
release Ramon for up to 48 hours after he was entitled to be released for the
burglary charges.163 The detainer request indicated the Department of
Homeland Security had probable cause that Ramon was “a removeable
alien,” and was in the United States in violation of civil immigration law.164
A bail bondsman attempted to post bail for Ramon on August 17,
2018, but was told Ramon would not be released, even if he posted bond,
because of the Border Patrol’s detailer request.165 On October 30, 2018,
Ramon filed a complaint, application for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and order to show cause, alleging the Sheriff’s cooperation with the federal detainer request was in violation of Montana law. The
Sheriff responded to the complaint, admitting Ramon would not be released
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

460 P.3d 867 (Mont. 2020).
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876
Id. at 880.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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on bail, and stating that the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office had complied
with immigration detainers on multiple occasions.166
The district court denied Ramon’s request for a preliminary injunction
and held Mont. Code Ann. § 7-32-2203(3) authorized the Sheriff to detain
Ramon on a federal civil immigration detainer request.167 Ramon appealed,
arguing first that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied because determining whether a Montana law enforcement officer had
the authority to make a civil immigration detention was a question of public
importance.168 Addressing the merits, Ramon asserted that holding a person
pursuant to an immigration detainer constitutes a new arrest, and that Montana law enforcement officers lack the authority to make such an arrest.169
The Sheriff argued Ramon’s appeal was moot because he was no longer
detained and could not seek injunctive relief, arguing no exceptions to the
mootness doctrine applied.170 Further, the Sheriff argued a civil immigration detention pursuant to an immigration detainer request is authorized
under Montana law.171
The Court first provided a background on immigration detainers, explaining that immigration detainers are civil matters and a person’s illegal
presence in the United States only amounts to a civil violation.172 Additionally, the Court explained federal immigration detainers, like Form I-247A,
only request state and local law enforcement’s cooperation, and any mandate by the Department of Homeland Security about such matters would
constitute commandeering under the Tenth Amendment.173
Next, the Court addressed the issue of mootness, finding that the questions presented—primarily whether a Montana law enforcement official
“has the authority to grant federal civil immigration detainers and deprive
Montana residents of their fundamental right to liberty based on a suspected
civil violation”—was an issue of public importance.174 Further, the Court
reasoned resolution of this issue would provide guidance for Montana law
enforcement officers confronting this issue with increasing regularity.175
The Court then discussed the merits of Ramon’s appeal, holding that
the grant of a federal immigration detainer request constituted an arrest
166. Id. at 871–72.
167. Id. at 872.
168. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 6, 9, Ramon v. Short (Mont. July 12, 2019) (No. DA 18-0661).
169. Id. at 7–8.
170. Defendant and Appellee’s Amended Answer Brief at 2, Ramon v. Short (Mont. Sept. 9, 2019)
(No. DA 18-0661).
171. Id. at 7.
172. Ramon, 460 P.3d at 872.
173. Id. at 873.
174. Id. at 874.
175. Id. at 874–75.
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under Montana law, and finding that a Montana law enforcement officer
lacks the authority to make a civil immigration arrest.176 In determining
whether granting a detainer request was an arrest, the Court highlighted the
“broad consensus around the nation that an immigration detainer constitutes
a new arrest.”177 Further, the Court examined the statutory definition of
“arrest,” as well as case law addressing the issue, concluding that “an immigration detainer effectuates a new restraint on an individual who otherwise
would be free to leave the custody of a local law enforcement officer.”178 In
Ramon’s case, when he was refused release upon attempting to post bail, he
was “effectively . . . [taken] back into custody,” which constituted a new
arrest.179
After concluding the immigration detainer was a new arrest, the Court
discussed whether a Montana law enforcement official had authority to conduct such an arrest.180 The Court first addressed whether any federal statute
authorizes state law enforcement officials to carry out civil immigration arrests.181 Under federal law, state law enforcement officials may only perform immigration functions in four “limited circumstances,” including
when (1) an agreement between state and federal governments is in place
authorizing adequately trained state officers to act as immigration officers,182 (2) “an actual or imminent mass influx of aliens arriving presents
urgent circumstances requiring immediate Federal response,”183 (3) a deported convicted felon reenters the United States, so long as the action is
authorized under state law,184 and (4) the arrested individual is violating
criminal prohibitions under federal immigration law.185 The Court concluded none of these limited circumstances were present in Ramon’s
case.186
Because no federal law authorized the arrest, the Court examined
whether such authority existed under state law.187 The Court concluded no
statute allows for warrantless civil immigration arrests.188 While the district
court and Sheriff asserted Mont. Code Ann. § 7-32-2203 provided authority
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
408–09
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 875, 880.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 876–77.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(10).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(c).
8 U.S.C. § 1324; Ramon, 460 P.3d at 878 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
(2012)).
Id. at 879.
Id. at 878 (citing Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1146 (Mass. 2017)).
Id. at 879.
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for Ramon’s arrest,189 the Court disagreed, stating the statue does not provide authority for an arrest.190 The Court further explained that the statute
only addresses “who can be housed in a detention center,” not who can be
arrested.191 The Court noted that while the Legislature has recently increased cooperation between state and federal officials related to immigration enforcement, no statute has yet been enacted authorizing civil immigration arrests.192 Finally, the Court noted Montana common law also does not
provide authority for such arrests.193
Justice Rice concurred with the majority, noting that while the state
common law may have authorized state cooperation with federal authorities
in the past, the Legislature’s enactment of statutes addressing state cooperation with other federal immigration issues has “covered the issue.”194 Further, Justice Rice clarified that nothing in his concurrence or the majority
opinion suggests state officials are “barred” from cooperating with federal
authorities “about detainees and their detention status, or cooperation in
other arrest contexts.”195
The Court’s decision is noteworthy for Montana practitioners working
in criminal law or immigration law. Most importantly, the decision directly
impacts how state law enforcement agencies may cooperate with federal
immigration requests, specifically by prohibiting agencies from detaining
individuals pursuant to a federal detainer request.
—Katy Lindberg

189. Mont. Code Ann. § 7-32-2203 states that detention centers are used “for the confinement of
persons committed for contempt or upon civil proves or by other authority of law.” The Sheriff argued,
and the District Court agreed that immigration enforcement is a civil process, and was therefore authorized under the statute.
190. Ramon, 460 P.3d at 879.
191. Id. at 880.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (J. Rice, Concurring).
195. Id.
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